

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 126810

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TAGS:PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: NATOMIN: SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS ON AGENDA ITEMS

--MBFR

THE FOLLOWING ARE SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS ON MBFR:

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF MBFR.

-- MBFR IS NO LESS CENTRAL TO DEVELOPING EAST-WEST RELATIONS THAN THE BILATERAL SALT TALKS OR THE MULTILATERAL CSCE TALKS. IN POLITICAL IMPACT, THE EFFECT OF REDUCING FORCE LEVELS IN CENTRAL EUROPE THREE DECADES AFTER THE END OF WWII CAN BE COMPARED WITH THE EFFECT OF CURBING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT, FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, THE SOVIET UNION WISHES TO SEE MBFR SUCCEED. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 126810

THEIR VIEW AND OUR VIEW OF WHAT CONSTITUTES UNDIMINISHED

SECURITY DO NOT NECESSARILY COINCIDE.

-- WE MAKE NO DIRECT LINK BETWEEN MBFR, ON THE ONE HAND,
AND SALT AND CSCE ON THE OTHER. OBVIOUSLY ALL THREE
NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE VIEWED TOGETHER AS BAROMETERS OF

DETENTE PROGRESS.

-- THE SOVIETS IN THE PAST HAVE SOUGHT TO LINK PROGRESS
IN MBFR WITH CSCE. IN OUR VIEW, THE BEST CHANCE FOR
SUCCESS IN MBFR LIES IN TREATING THIS COMPLEX NEGOTIATION
SEPARATELY FROM OTHER ON-GOING EAST-WEST EFFORTS.
BALANCING THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE ALLIED PARTICIPANTS
IN MBFR IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH WITHOUT BRINGING IN OTHER
PROBLEMS.

B. NATO COHESIVENESS AND DETENTE.

-- THE MBFR TALKS ARE STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE. CON-
SULTATIONS HAVE BEEN THOROUGH AND UNITY HAS BEEN MAIN-
TAINED DESPITE THE COMPLEX SECURITY INTERESTS INVOLVED.
THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO APPROACH MBFR IN THE
SPIRIT OF ALLIED COHESIVENESS.

-- THE TALKS CAN HELP TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE OF
A MORE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE FRAMEWORK AND POSTURE.

-- THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE ESTABLISHED BY MBFR IS AN
IMPORTANT ADJUNCT TO THE OVERALL EFFORT OF BUILDING UNDER-
STANDING AND ENHANCING STABILITY IN EUROPE.

-- WHILE WE HAVE A GOOD BASIC POSITION AND SHOULD HOLD TO
IT, WE SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME INDICATE TO THE EAST THAT
WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO MEET THEIR CONCERNS. WE
RECOGNIZE THAT MBFR MUST DEAL WITH THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS OF EACH OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES.

C. MOSCOW SUMMIT AND MBFR.

-- A BRIEF WORD ABOUT MBFR AND THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 126810

MOSCOW. IT WAS LARGELY AT U.S. IMPETUS THAT WE GOT THE
MBFR PROCESS STARTED. LACK OF MOVEMENT IN THE TALKS
CAN HAVE DOMESTIC REPERCUSSIONS FOR ALL OF US. SO FAR
WE HAVE CONTAINED THE PRESSURES FOR AMERICAN TROOP
REDUCTIONS.

-- THUS FAR THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN ACTIVE OUTSIDE THE
VIENNA FRAMEWORK. HOWEVER, AN ANALYSIS OF VIENNA

SUGGESTS POSSIBLE SOVIET INTEREST IN A SYMBOLIC EQUAL NUMERICAL REDUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES.

-- WHILE IN MOSCOW WE WILL WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A US-SOVIET REDUCTION AS A FIRST PHASE. IF THE SOVIETS MAKE A PROPOSAL, WE WILL COME BACK TO THE NAC TO CONSULT. SHOULD THERE BE A CHANCE FOR PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT, OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO OBTAIN A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO INITIAL REDUCTIONS ONLY IN US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES, IN THE CONTEXT OF A NON-INCREASE IN THE FORCES OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

D. PHASING

-- WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE WHETHER THE ASSURANCES THAT WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF GIVING THE SOVIETS ABOUT PHASE II WILL SUFFICE TO INDUCE THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO US/USSR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD PUT FORWARD ALL THE ASSURANCES DISCUSSED IN THE NAC, INCLUDING WILLINGNESS OF ALL NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN PHASE II. THE ALLIES WOULD THEN BE IN A MORE FAVORABLE NEGOTIATING POSITION.

-- WE WILL PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS ALTHOUGH WE HAVE TAKEN NO DECISION YET ABOUT WHETHER WE OURSELVES WILL REDUCE OUR FORCES AS A RESULT OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. THAT DECISION WILL DEPEND IN SOME MEASURE ON THE OUTCOME OF PHASE I.

E. NUCLEAR OPTION.

-- THE US HAS TAKEN NO DECISION ABOUT PRESENTING THE SO-CALLED "NUCLEAR OPTION" TO THE EAST. FOR THE MOMENT, WE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 126810

BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE CURRENT EFFORT TO INDUCE THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO OUR TWO-PHASED APPROACH.

F. FLANK SECURITY.

-- IF THE SUBJECT IS RAISED, YOU MAY WISH TO SAY THAT WE OPPOSE ANY MBFR OUTCOME WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE THREAT TO THE NATO FLANKS. HOWEVER, MEASURES DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, IF APPLIED RECIPROCALLY, COULD HINDER US FLEXIBILITY IN DEFENDING NATO INCLUDING THE FLANK STATES THEMSELVES. THEREFORE WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED IS A GENERAL FORMULATION PUTTING THE SOVIETS ON NOTICE THAT REDEPLOYING WITHDRAWN FORCES AGAINST THE FLANK STATES WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE COUNTER

TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL.

G. BERLIN.

-- IF GENSCHER SHOULD RAISE BERLIN, YOU MAY WISH TO SAY
WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF PERMITTING THE SOVIETS TO ACHIEVE

ENHANCED PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN OR OF DENIGRATING OUR
ACCESS RIGHTS IN ANY WAY BECAUSE OF MBFR. IF THE FRENCH,
BRITISH AND GERMANS WISH TO DO SO, WE ARE PREPARED AT ANY
TIME TO DISCUSS MBFR IN THE BONN GROUP WITH A VIEW TO
ACHIEVING A UNIFIED POSITION ON BERLIN ASPECTS OF MBFR.
HOWEVER, WE OURSELVES BELIEVE SUCH DISCUSSION IS PREMATURE
AT THIS TIME BECAUSE THE SHAPE OF INDIVIDUAL MEASURES IS
NOT CLEAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT US TO ENVISAGE HOW THEY WOULD
AFFECT THE STATUS OF BERLIN.

H. EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II.

-- IF OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS ASK WHAT OUR PREFERENCES
ARE CONCERNING ASSURANCES TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT EUROPEAN
PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II, YOU MAY WISH TO REPLY THAT WE
BELIEVE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ASSURANCE WOULD BE TO STATE
THAT ALL NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL REDUCE THEIR
FORCES IN THE NGA AS THE RESULT OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE
II AGREEMENT. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 126810

UNITED KINGDOM TO JOIN IN SUCH A DECLARATION. SISCO

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